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FIGURE 1: SOUTH FLORIDA, THE AREA IMPACTED BY HURRICANE 
ANDREW AND SURROUNDING REGION, AND THE STUDY 
AREA FOR THIS REPORT 
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1. Artificial reefs heavily ~amaged and moved. 
2. Offshore coral reefs may be destroyed or damaged; heavy loss of lobster traps. 
3. Seagrass communities had minor direct damage but may be affected by erosion and 
increased nutrients from runoff. 
4. Mangroves flattened, uprooted, or defoliated. 
5. Exotic tree species damaged but expected to spread widely and rapidly. 
6. Hardwood hammocks heavily damaged or destroyed. 
7. Sawgrass visibly unaffected. 
8. Moderate to minor pineland and cypress tree damage. 
9. Mangrove damage from north of Cape Sable to south of Ten Thousand Islands. 
Adapted from T. Grantham, Miami Herald 09-08-92 
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When we heard that Hurricane Andrew had slammed 
into the south Florida coastline early in the morning of 
August 24, 1992, bringing steady winds between 135 and 
155 MPH, gusts as high as 170 MPH, spawning even more 
destructive tornado winds, killing several dozen people, 
and leaving in its wake approximately 20 billion dollars 
in property damage, we assumed there must have been 
correspondingly devastating impacts on south Florida's 
commercial fisheries and fishing peoples (Aide 1993: 1, 
and Sun-Sentinel 1992). And, later that same day, when 
television news began to broadcast pictures of Andrew's 
horrible destruction, we figured that commercial fishing 
peoples in the region must have suffered severe impacts 
indeed. Certainly, a storm as violent and intense as 
Hurricane Andrew must have exacted a tragic toll from 
south Florida's commercial fishing peoples. 
Over the next few weeks we drafted proposals and 
applied for Quick Response Grants from the Natural 
Hazards Research and Information Applications Center, 
which is located on the campus of the University of 
Colorado, Boulder, Colorado. As maritime 
anthropologists, we are interested in fishing peoples 
and fishing communities, and we were especially 
interested in what had happened to south Florida's 
commercial fishing peoples as a result of Hurricane 
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Andrew. Eventually, we learned that our proposals had 
been favorably reviewed and we made plans to leave for 
south Florida. 
We feel that commercial fishing peoples merit 
special attention when extreme events impact the coastal 
zones in which they work and live, and mainly for the 
following reasons: first, commercial fishers are almost 
always present in such regions; second, they are a 
distinct and easily recognizable sociocultural and 
occupational component of the larger coastal population; 
and third, their high degree of dependency on coastal 
resources and facilities leaves them particularly 
vulnerable to extreme events occurring in the coastal 
zones in which they work and live. 
For studying the problems of commercial fishers, we 
have found the concept of the "natural-resource 
community" to be very useful (see Dyer, Gill, and Picou 
(1992). In the fisheries, we define "natural-resource 
communities" as peoples whose economic welfare and 
sociocultural identities are similarly articulated with, 
and dependent upon, certain marine resources. In this 
sense, a "fishing community" may include peoples living 
in a named, nucleated settlement, which obviously has a 
great deal of fishing industry, as well as dispersed 
commercial fishers living here and there along a 
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coastline who do not live in a particular settlement. 
What is important is that fishers in either situation 
have much in common, and for purposes of assessing their 
problems and needs it is useful to conceptualize them as 
natural-resource communities--as defined above. 
Because of the linearity of coastlines, marine 
fishers are often dispersed, at least to some degree. 
Moreover, when they are few in number, highly dispersed, 
and there is no visible settlement that might be 
described as a "fishing community" in conventional 
terms, such peoples may be neglected or overlooked when 
extreme events impact the coastlines where they work and 
live. Thus, by defining the commercial-fishing 
"community" as peoples who are highly articulated with 
certain marine resources, there is less chance that such 
people will be overlooked--such as when assessing the 
impact of an extreme event in a coastal zone. 
We also feel that conventional definitions of "the 
fisheries" must be expanded, such that these are 
primarily thought of as human sociocultural and economic 
phenomena, rather than merely as a marine realm or a 
stock of marine life in a particular marine realm. 
Thus, terms such as "the Biscayne Bay fishery" or "the 
spiny-lobster fishery," should automatically imply the 
presence of human fishers working there, since without 
human activity in a marine realm there is no fishery 
there per se. 
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There is also another, more general reason why we 
feel commercial fishing peoples deserve special 
attention when extreme events occur in coastal regions. 
And this is simply that in spite of their empirical 
reality, their sociocultural attributes, and their 
economic importance, they are otherwise often overlooked 
and neglected when extreme events impact coastal areas. 
Indeed, now that the first phase of our study of the 
impacts of Hurricane Andrew on south Florida's 
commercial fishing peoples is complete, we are even more 
firm in this conviction. 
As maritime anthropologists, we made a good team in 
our study in south Florida. Dr. McGoodwin has 
specialized in marine fisheries since the early 1970's, 
has conducted research concerning fisheries policies 
under the auspices of the Woods Hole Oceanographic 
Institution and the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations, and has extensive field experience 
working among fishing peoples in a variety of cultural 
settings. His recent book, Crisis in the World's 
Fisheries: People, Problems, and Policies (McGoodwin 
1990) has received critical acclaim for urging that new, 
more inclusive, and more humanistic approaches be tried 
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out in fisheries management. Dr. Dyer also brings 
important field experience, training, and insights to 
the study of commercial fishing peoples. Currently he 
serves on the Gulf of Mexico Fisheries Management 
Council (GOMFMC), a component of the National Marine 
Fisheries Services' fisheries-management system which 
has responsibility for recommending management policies 
for south Florida's fisheries (among others). This 
position has provided Dr. Dyer with a large number of 
contacts with other professionals in the natural-
resources management "establishment" in south Florida. 
He also holds a degree in Fisheries Biology, as well as 
an advanced degree in Marine Ecology--some rare 
credentials among maritime anthropologists. 
Prior to our departure 
Prior to leaving we made several telephone calls in 
order to set up appointments for interviews with state 
and federal officials working in south Florida, as well 
as to learn what we could about the situation there in 
advance of our arrival. We contacted agency 
representatives of the Florida Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR) , the Southeast Fisheries Center of the 
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), the local FEMA 
response team assigned to natural resources, various 
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participants in the commercial fishing industry, and 
other local residents of Miami and Dade county. We also 
read everything we could in order to familiarize 
ourselves with the region and Hurricane Andrew's impact. 
Our plan was to spend nearly a week in south 
Florida and to interview as many governmental and 
scientific authorities as we could, as well as people in 
the commercial fishing industry. We also planned to 
visit as many sites as possible so that we could get a 
general idea of the hurricane's impact on the region's 
commercial fishing peoples, as well as an understanding 
of their most immediate needs in the storm's aftermath. 
Just prior to our departure we read a curious item 
in National Fisherman, the main journal of record for 
the commercial fishing industry in the English-speaking 
countries (Fee 1992: 12). The article, which cited a 
biologist from the Florida DNR, portrayed Hurricane 
Andrew's impact on south Florida's commercial fishers as 
minimal. "This was not the storm" that scientists had 
predicted for years would hit south Florida, the DNR 
biologist was quoted as saying. Elsewhere, regarding 
Andrew's impact on south Florida's commercial fishing 
industry, the article stated that "most of south 
Florida's commercial fishing industry was untouched by 
it," and " ••• commercial fishermen were wide-eyed over 
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their good luck." Local marine biologists were also 
cited as expressing regrets that the storm had not had 
more impact on the sea floor in the region, which, they 
said, had long been denied the beneficial, cleansing 
effects that a major storm might provide. 
Thus, as we prepared to leave we wondered whether 
we would find any significant impacts on south Florida's 
commercial fishing peoples to study. Could it be that a 
storm of the reported magnitude of Hurricane Andrew had 
struck this populous coastline, and yet the region's 
commercial fishers had come through practically 
unscathed, as the article had said? 
In the field 
We arrived in south Florida on October 31, 1992, 
and promptly got underway. The first thing we did was 
to make a quick inspection of as many places as we could 
see along the most severely impacted part of the coast, 
and overall we found the devastation to be far worse 
than we had anticipated. All the photographs and 
televised news we had seen prior to leaving for 
our trip had fallen far short of conveying the actual 
extent and severity of the storm on south Florida and 
its local inhabitants. 
We made this initial reconnaissance in a rented 
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automobile during our first two days in Florida, 
spending most of this time interviewing various 
commercial fishers, learning about how the hurricane had 
impacted their work and lives, what their immediate 
needs were, and so forth. We had little trouble gaining 
entry into practically all of the areas we wanted to 
see; indeed, we were able to pass freely into some 
areas which were still off-limits to the general public, 
and which were being patrolled by state police or 
federal troops. For the most part, all we had to do was 
explain what we were doing, show some identification and 
other documentation indicating what our interests were, 
and we were allowed to go practically anywhere we 
wanted. 
After this initial phase of our field work we met 
with officials in various agencies we had contacted 
prior to our arrival, mixing these appointments in with 
visits to commercial fishers and fish processors located 
in, and immediately around, the Miami metropolitan area. 
Then, near the end of our stay, we travelled to Key 
Largo, which is south of the hurricane's main impact 
area, and which various agency officials assured us had 
not been significantly impacted by the hurricane. In 
Key Largo we looked over commercial fishing fleets and 
talked with local fishers and fish processors. 
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Overall, we conducted interviews with all the 
governmental authorities we had originally planned to 
contact, as well as with key respondents in the local 
fishing industry, including fishers, processors, dock 
operators, and others involved in the commercial-fishing 
sector. These interviews were supplemented with 
telephone interviews of agency representatives of the 
NMFS, the local FEMA response team assigned to natural 
resources, the Florida DNR, and local residents of Miami 
and Dade Counties who had experienced the disaster 
event. Many of our interviews were conducted as 
unscheduled, informal dockside intercepts. 
Everyone we interviewed was queried in an open 
manner, and we always began by explaining that we wanted 
to elicit their perceptions of the impacts of the storm 
on local, commercial fisheries, as well as what they 
thought the commercial fishers' most immediate needs for 
relief were now. Everyone we talked with was given the 
opportunity to decline to be interviewed, or to supply 
any other information that he/she might prefer to supply 
instead. 
The foregoing information was supplemented by other 
information which we gleaned from NMFS's Fishing Trend 
Reports, news articles, newsletters, and other published 
material we requested be sent to us after our departure. 
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We also received lists of commercial fishers for Dade 
County from the Florida DNR, as well as lists of 
processors from the NMFS in Miami. Moreover, we have 
continued to make queries concerning what is being done 
for south Florida's commercial fishing peoples in the 
aftermath of Andrew, both in writing and by telephone, 
right up to the time of this report. 
In what follows we first summarize the view of the 
hurricane's impact on commercial fishers that emerged 
from out of our meetings with various agency officials 
and scientists in the area. Overall, they corroborated 
what we had read in the National Fisherman shortly 
before we arrived in Florida, that is, that the 
hurricane's impact on commercial fishers in south 
Florida had been minimal. After this, we will summarize 
the view that emerged from our meetings with commercial 
fishers and fish processors in south Florida. Overall, 
they provided an opposite view, stressing that the 
hurricane had wrought severe impacts on them--a view to 
which we now bear witness. 
"Minimal impact," the agencies said 
For the most part, the various agencies and 
research institutions we queried during our study were 
the ones we assumed would have been highly involved in 
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assessing the impact of the hurricane on the region's 
commercial fishing peoples, as well as in coordinating, 
and implementing relief for those peoples. All of 
these agencies and research institutions have offices in 
the Miami area, and all are within an hour's drive, or 
less, from the center of destruction along the coast. 
The Florida DNR. Prior to leaving for our trip we 
had contacted the Florida DNR in order to learn about 
the impact of Hurricane Andrew on south Florida's 
commercial fishing peoples. Instead, that agency 
provided us with information concerning what might have 
happened to certain valuable marine stocks, but 
otherwise had no information concerning the storm's 
impact on south Florida's commercial fishing peoples. 
Once we arrived in south Florida and looked into this 
matter further, we found that this agency still had not 
produced any reports or any other data concerning the 
impact of Hurricane Andrew on south Florida's commercial 
fishing peoples. And, as far as we know, it still has 
not undertaken any such studies--now nearly 7 months 
since the storm hit south Florida. 
However, we also learned that the Florida DNR is 
mainly responsible for assessing the status of 
commercially-valuable marine stocks, as well as other 
marine-biological conditions, and is not charged with 
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fisheries management per see We were given the 
impression that this agency is mainly responsible for 
reporting its assessments of stock conditions to the 
National Marine Fisheries Service, and otherwise leaves 
most fisheries-management responsibilities, and 
agency-fisher working relationships, to that federal 
agency. 
The NMFS. We also visited the Southeast Fisheries 
Center of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) 
in Miami, and met with its director and various members 
of his key staff. Overall, they stressed that the 
hurricane's impact on fishing peoples in south Florida 
had been minimal to non-existent, mainly, they said, 
because there were "almost no commercial fishermen" in 
the south Florida region. For the most part, they said, 
south Florida is mainly a recreational fishery, and the 
few commercial fishers that exist in this region are few 
in number and very dispersed. Recreational fishers, 
they told us, had indeed suffered considerable losses, 
both in terms of lost or badly damaged boats as well as 
severely damaged boat facilities. However, most of the 
boat owners had insurance, they told us, and in any 
event the storm's impact on them could not be seen as 
particularly grievous since they do not depend on 
fishing for the livelihoods. 
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Overall, the personnel we talked with at NMFS in 
Miami stressed that south Florida's handful of 
commercial fishers had come through practically 
unscathed. Curiously, we also learned that nobody who 
worked in these offices had made any visits to south 
Florida in order to see what impacts commercial fishers 
might have suffered. When asked why, they repeated that 
there simply were not many commercial fishers in the 
region. And, so far as we know, this agency has still 
not made any efforts to assess the impact of Hurricane 
Andrew on south Florida's commercial fishers, nor to 
learn what is needed in terms of relief and 
reconstruction. 
Near the end of our visit to the NMFS offices in 
Miami, the officials we met with mentioned an important 
group of commercial fishers whose boats and processing 
facilities were berthed along the Miami River, right in 
downtown Miami. These fished for spiny lobsters, they 
said, a highly-valuable species, and because their boats 
all had ridden out the storm safely secured in their 
berths along the Miami River, they assured us that these 
fishers had " come through just fine." When we asked if 
anybody from NMFS had interviewed any of these fishers, 
one staff member joked with us, saying, "no , how could 
we, none of us speak Cuban." 
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The RSMAS. We also visited the Rosentiel School of 
Marine and Atmospheric Science (RSMAS), which is just 
across the street from the offices of the Southeast 
Fisheries Center of the NMFS. RSMAS, Florida's most 
prestigious marine-science institution, is a part of the 
University of Miami, and is supported to a great degree 
by the Sea Grant Research Program of the National 
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). 
NOAA, of course, also administers the NMFS. 
While at RSMAS we learned that this institution 
already had a large-scale proposal in development which 
entailed an ambitious assessment of the impact of 
Hurricane Andrew along the south Florida coast. 
However, this proposal included no plans to study the 
storm's impact on commercial fishing peoples. The draft 
proposal we obtained from RSMAS after our visit to 
Florida indicated that interdisciplinary scientific 
teams, staffed almost entirely by researchers from 
RSMAS, were going to investigate the storm's impact on 
the region's marine biology, geology, water chemistry, 
and other phenomena reflecting traditional oceanographic 
concerns. And now, despite our urging that RSMAS 
broaden its study to include assessments of the storm's 
impact on commercial fishing peoples, we have had no 
response, nor any other indications from that 
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institution, suggesting that it has any plans to do so. 
Momentarily, we were encouraged when, after our 
return from Florida, we received from RSMAS a 
comprehensive description of the research it planned to 
undertake, which included a section describing an intent 
to study the "Boating Community" in south Florida. 
However, it seems this will mainly entail studying how 
sunken boats--nearly all from the recreational 
sector--are now contributing to the pollution of the 
region's harbors and bays as they slowly leak fuels and 
lubricants into the water. 
The FEMA and the SBA. Two other agencies might 
have focused some special attention on commercial 
fishing peoples in south Florida, yet as far as we know 
have not. These are the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), and the Small Business Administration 
(SBA). Perhaps this is understandable, at least in view 
of the magnitude of destruction Andrew caused compared 
with the limited resources these agencies had to work 
with. The FEMA, for example, was overwhelmed with the 
local populace's needs for such fundamentals as food, 
clothing, and shelter, and did not have sufficient 
personnel or other resources that might allow it to 
address the special needs of a particular occupational 
sector--such as commercial fishers. Similarly, with 
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more than 82,000 businesses badly damaged or utterly 
destroyed in the region, the SBA did not have adequate 
resources for addressing the problems of any particular 
business sector, although we did learn of a few loans it 
made to various commercial fishers (Aide 1993: 1). 
Hurricane Andrew's Impact on Florida's Fisheries 
Information we have gathered before, during, and 
after our field study, as well as that which can be 
inferred from data provided by various governmental 
agencies, professionals working in Florida's fisheries, 
and scientific and media sources, all lead to the 
inescapable conclusion that Hurricane Andrew's impact on 
Florida's commercial fishers was far more extensive and 
severe than has been officially acknowledged. 
Practically everywhere we looked we discovered grievous 
impacts, and practically every fisherman and processor 
we talked to had a tragic story to tell. In what 
follows, we summarize the impacts to Florida's fisheries 
that we were able to discover in a comparatively short 
amount of time, and with a comparatively small amount of 
effort. 
General impacts on south Florida's fishing peoples 
and fishing industry. In general, all fishers, fish 
processors, and fish marketeers throughout south Florida 
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(including those located throughout the Florida Keys) 
experienced severe economic hardships in the months 
following the storm as a result of drastic declines in 
demand for the marine products they customarily 
produced, processed, or traded. Thus, even fishers who 
otherwise suffered no direct damages from the storm to 
their vessels, gear, shore facilities, or targeted 
marine species in the south Florida region, including 
those located throughout the Florida Keys, were still 
very adversely impacted by the storm. 
This is a less visible but no-less-real adverse 
impact of the storm on local fishing peoples, which is 
not as dramatic, perhaps, as boats smashed and sunk at 
their berths, but no less deadly from a socioeconomic 
perspective. With more 160,000 people forced to find 
other places to live immediately following the storm, 
and 82,000 businesses damaged or destroyed, which 
brought about widespread unemployment in the impacted 
region, a large segment of south Florida's populace was 
left at least temporarily unable to purchase seafoods 
(Aide 1993: 1). This problem still persists for many 
members of the fishing industry who live in south 
Florida, with many fishers who survived the storm more 
or less intact now finding themselves unable to stay in 
business. Of course, this in turn has adverse effects 
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on still more people who work in businesses which serve 
the fishing industry--those working in boat repair 
yards, businesses selling fishing gear and other 
equipment, and so forth. 
Impacts on the spiny lobster industry. Spiny 
lobsters are an important, especially valuable natural 
resource in southeast Florida, with the nearshore areas 
of Biscayne Bay and Biscayne National Park (see Figure 
1) being major harvest areas for fishers from Dade and 
Monroe Counties. We interviewed approximately a dozen 
lobster fishers, as well as key personnel working in a 
major lobster processing plant along the Miami River 
docks, asking them about the impacts of Andrew on their 
fishery. 
Overall, we learned, there are approximately 60 
fishermen who work as primary producers out of 22 boats 
along the Miami River. All but two or three of these 
are from Cuban backgrounds, the remainder being Anglo 
Americans. They fish for lobster with wooden and wire 
frame traps which are weighted with concrete and baited 
with cowhide. These traps cost approximately $16 to $17 
each. One boat can work between 800 to 1500 traps, 
tending around 200 per trip. 
These fishermen had many traps out when Andrew hit, 
and estimate that they lost 70%-80% of them due to the 
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storm. On average, each fishing boat (which, for the 
most part, is a distinct business enterprise in this 
fishery) lost around 1,000 traps, or about $16,000 worth 
of vital fishing gear in terms of its replacement cost. 
Recall, on the other hand, that the core staff members 
of the NMFS we interviewed made no mention of any 
serious losses borne by these fishers as a result of the 
storm. 
The Miami River lobster fishers reported that they 
had received some aid from the Florida SBA and the FEMA, 
mainly in the form of small loans for purchasing new 
lobster traps. The amount of the loans they were deemed 
eligible for were based on their past catch receipts. 
Thus, the SBA made an estimate based on past reports of 
lobster catches, estimated how many traps this 
corresponded with, and thus determined the extent of 
loans it would make to each applicant who was seeking to 
replace lost gear. However, the formula used by the SBA 
resulted in a gear deficit, since prior to the storm the 
average catch-per-trap only rarely ran as high as the 
estimate used by the SBA. 
The hurricane was described as a disaster by the 
fishermen we talked with along the Miami River, since 
their net loss of traps came about at a time when their 
local industry was already economically depressed. The 
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primary cause cited by these local fishers for the 
economic downturn in the fishery prior to Andrew was 
over-regulation. In 1991, for example, they paid a gear 
levy of $0.15 per trap. This levy was raised to $0.50 
per trap a few months before the hurricane. The 
fishermen indicated that they were aware that this 
increase was an attempt by regulatory officials to 
decrease overall effort in the fishery, but noted that 
it had not had that effect. Instead, they said, 
everybody just paid the increase and kept on fishing 
as before, or even harder in some cases in an attempt 
to offset the higher costs posed by the additional levy. 
NOw, they stated, even though the total number of 
traps being utilized was much less than the number being 
utilized prior to the storm, the "government" was 
maintaining the levy at the same, pre-storm level. They 
expressed anger about this, saying they had no idea what 
the money goes for. They also bitterly complained that 
foreign fishermen, mainly Nicaraguans and Mexicans, were 
not taxed as highly and were allowed to fish more 
freely, and with more effective gear. Overall, they 
lamented that they had been in an adversarial 
relationship with fishery officials from the DNR and the 
NMFS for a long time. 
Indeed, catch data we have subsequently obtained 
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indicates that their catches were stable over at least 
three years prior to the hurricane, perhaps indicating a 
healthy, or at least stable, lobster stock, and calling 
to question the need to increase the levies on their 
traps prior to the storm. Regardless, whether the 
fishery was actually healthy or depressed prior to 
Andrew, catch data following the hurricane leave no 
doubt that it had a devastating impact on this fishery. 
One processor showed us daily-activity reports 
indicating unusually large catches of lobster during the 
last three days of fishing before Andrew hit, and then, 
immediately after the disaster his data indicated that 
the lobsters had all but disappeared from the fishing 
grounds. And, even by mid-February, six months after 
Andrew swept through the region's lobster fisheries, 
catches were still unusually low, leading one DNR 
official to characterize the season as overall "very 
poor." 
Recently, we have also learned (and opposite from 
what DNR biologists reported immediately following the 
storm) that bottom substrates in the lobster fishery 
were severely impacted by the storm, perhaps with 
devastating consequences for lobster stocks. Whether 
this disruption of the sea floor has greatly reduced 
overall lobster stocks, or instead only greatly altered 
-23-
their customary migration routes, making it difficult 
for fishers to locate them, is uncertain. Whatever is 
the case, Hurricane Andrew had a devastating impact on 
this region's overall lobster catches, and it is an 
adverse impact which persists today. 
Our informants along the Miami River also told us 
that all fishermen, from Miami all the way down to Key 
West, had been hurt by the storm. The spiny lobster, 
they told us, was similarly important to fishers 
throughout the Florida Keys. Thus, late in our visit to 
south Florida, we travelled to Key Largo, the north-most 
of the major Keys, which had otherwise been missed by 
Andrew's strong winds, in order to see what impact the 
storm had, if any, on commercial fishing there. 
In most of the Keys, we learned, electricity had 
not been available for general public use for up to 
three weeks following the storm. Commercial fishers, as 
well as fish processors, who were otherwise unharmed by 
the storm, were temporarily put out of business. 
Fishers, for example, had nobody to sell their products 
to due to the lack of cold-storage, while processors 
were put out of operation for the same reason. 
Moreover, processors lost most of the stored products 
they had on hand due to spoilage. As a port agent from 
Monroe County reported on August 27, three days after 
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the hurricane hit: 
Hurricane Andrew has severely limited all 
fishing in the keys beginning on the 22nd when 
warnings were first posted. Although the keys 
were spared a direct hit, the storm still 
dealt a blow to the fishing industry. In the 
upper keys, early reports indicated some craft 
and many lobster traps were destroyed. And, 
the shoreside infrastructure that escaped 
damage was still non-functional due to power 
outages and transport problems. Even 
fishermen in the lower keys were idled by 
Andrew. That was because most dealers held 
their boats at the dock until logistics with 
those few buyers still operational were 
arranged. 
After a three-week hiatus in fishing activity, a 
handful of processors in the keys were able to resume 
operations by promising to provide ice to the regional 
populace at fixed prices in return for being given 
priority in the restoration of electrical power. 
Otherwise, most processors--and a large number of 
fishers--remained closed and out of operation, with many 
remaining so at the time of this report. As mentioned 
above, with such drastically decreased demand for the 
seafoods they customarily processed, many found 
themselves economically unable to resume business 
operations. 
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As of February, 1993, the spiny lobster catch was 
still well below average throughout south Florida, 
including the keys. Most lodal fishery officials feel 
the reason is Andrew's disturbance of seafloor bottom 
substrates, which has in turn altered normal lobster 
migration patterns. Thus, we may conclude that 
Hurricane Andrew had a severe and extensive impact on 
south Florida's important spiny lobster industry--an 
impact which is still being felt now. Moreover, the 
extent of damage to this fishery alone suggests that the 
initial reports of minimal damage to fisheries in south 
Florida were considerably underestimated. And now, more 
than half a year since the hurricane swept through south 
Florida, while earnest efforts are underway to determine 
the hurricane's overall impact on marine environments 
and marine-biological resources, we are aware of no 
studies which are similarly underway to determine the 
social and economic impacts of the storm on the region's 
commercial fishing populace, much less their current 
needs for relief and reconstruction. 
Impacts on the bait-shrimp industry. Bait-shrimp 
fishers sell their catches to recreational fishers. We 
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interviewed bait fishers working out of the large 
recreational marinas in Coconut Grove in metropolitan 
Miami, as well as at the Black Point marina, south down 
the coast, approximately where the center of the eye of 
the storm came ashore. 
The Black Point marina suffered the most severe 
damages we saw anywhere along the Florida coastline. 
All its facilities, and all the recreational fishing 
boats kept there, were severely damaged, with most of 
the recreational boats being a complete loss. 
The fishing vessels used by bait. fishermen working 
at Black Point came through somewhat better. All 15 of 
the "bait boats" operating out of this marina had been 
severely damaged, and several were a complete loss. 
That proportionately more of the commercial boats than 
the recreational ones came through in at least 
salvageable condition can be attributed to the 
commercial fishermen's greater experience and knowledge 
concerning how to secure their boats against extreme 
storms, and also because most commercial fishermen lived 
near the marina and were able to get there well before 
the storm hit the coast. Most of the recreational boat 
owners, on the other hand, had not come to the marina to 
secure their boats before the storm hit. Nevertheless, 
when we visited this area--two months after the 
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storm--only 2 of the bait boats were operational, while 
the rest were either undergoing repairs or waiting for 
their owners to find sufficient resources to begin 
repairs on them. 
While all the fishermen we interviewed at Black 
Point stated that they had sustained considerable damage 
to their fishing craft, they were emphatic that repairs 
were being hampered by the lack of financial assistance 
from agencies which they felt should be responsible for 
helping them. Several fishermen commented that nobody 
from the "fisheries service" (i.e., the Nl.fFS) had ever 
come around to talk to them about damages they had 
sustained, or to ask what their particular problems and 
needs were in the aftermath of the storm. When they 
heard that we would be meeting with the core staff at 
the NMFS regional offices in Miami, one group of 
fishermen urged us to "tell them we're hurting." 
At the Black Point marina the nearly complete loss 
of the recreational fishing boats there had brought 
extreme hardship to local bait fishermen. Even the 
dozen or so bait fishermen who were back in operation 
found that without recreational customers to buy their 
catches they were effectively left with no market for 
their production. 
One fisherman we spoke with was particularly 
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informative concerning how grievously the hurricane had 
impacted he and his family, as well as how they had 
secured relief from various agencies. After securing 
his two boats somewhat inshore of the Black Point 
marina, he described how he, his wife, and their four 
small children had survived the storm by taking shelter 
in their nearby home. The house was totally destroyed, 
he said, yet miraculously they had all survived with only 
minor injuries. In spite of this, he was emphatic that 
he would never again choose to ride out a hurricane by 
taking shelter in his own home if he could otherwise 
find shelter out of the storm's direct path instead. 
Afterwards, he said he and his family found relief in 
one of the tents the FEMA helped erect for peoples left 
homeless by the storm, and eventually, after being 
helped by relatives and friends, they returned to their 
own house site and began reconstruction there. 
This young man, as well as several friends who 
crewed with him, were busily repairing his one, 
remaining boat when we interviewed him. He said it 
would be another two weeks before his boat would be 
operational, and that had the hurricane not hit this 
region he might be making as much as $2,000 per week. 
Brown shrimp, he stated, were currently very abundant, 
but because of damages to his boat he was not able to 
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fish for them, and even if he could he was uncertain 
whether he could sell his catches. He also expressed 
concern about the long-term effects on bait-shrimp 
stocks which might result from the massive destruction 
of the mangroves in his vicinity, which, he emphasized, 
were the rearing grounds for the shrimp he targeted. 
Indeed, as we talked with him we were amazed to see the 
extent of destruction of the mangrove stands nearby, 
which looked for all the world like a tangle of millions 
of sticks and limbs, with no green leaves showing. 
Particularly interesting was his telling us how he 
had raised funds to help with repairs on his boat. 
Apparently, he and his family had received aid for basic 
living needs from the FEMA, but otherwise had received 
no help, nor any queries concerning needs for help, from 
any agencies which might have helped him to resume 
fishing activities sooner. Thus, he credited the 
persistence of his wife, who, he said, had stayed on the 
telephone and refused to become ensnared in 
bureaucratic red tape, for eventually prying some loan 
money out of the SBA, which he was now using to repair 
his one, remaining fishing boat. His cohorts, he said, 
had received nothing. 
By comparison, the bait fishermen working out of 
the Coconut Grove marina in greater Miami reported a 
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decreased demand for their products ever since the 
storm, but otherwise stated that their losses were minor 
compared with those suffered by their counterparts 
working out of the Black point marina. Otherwise, and 
like their counterparts at Black Point, they similarly 
expressed concern over what effect the storm might have 
on future shrimp-stock levels stemming from destruction 
of mangrove habitats along the coast. 
Impacts on artificial reefs. Artificial reefs 
deployed along southeast Florida's coastline are 
important to the region's commercial and recreational 
fishers, as well as other components of the state's 
recreational sector such as the diving industry. 
Artificial reefs consist of sunken vessels or other 
man-made structures, such as old oil rigs, and greatly 
increase the productivity of marine life practically 
anywhere they are located. 
Among the twenty-six major artificial reefs situated 
in the region hit by Andrew, twenty-two were damaged, 
fifteen severely. Those severely damaged included the 
Arida (flattened and crushed), the Almirante (turned 
upside down), the Miracles Express (reduced to rubble), 
the Tarpon, and the Belzona Barge, which remains 
completely missing, even now! Concerning the Belzona 
Barge, Ben Mostkof, Artificial Reef Coordinator in south 
-31-
Florida stated: 
This was a barge two-thirds the length of a 
football field. It was so large that it took 
five minutes to swim its length. It's not the 
kind of thing you would think would just 
disappear (Mostkof 1992). 
The artificial reefs which have been placed off the 
Dade coast from the Broward line to Homestead are the 
backbone of the local diving industry--including both 
its recreational and commercial sectors. Important 
commercial and recreational species which are found in 
and around these reefs include jacks, snapper, sea bass, 
and grouper. 
The devastation wrought on artificial reefs is also 
clear evidence that seafloor configurations were 
severely modified by the force of Andrew in the impact 
area, a finding which is clearly opposite to what was 
reported in National Fisherman shortly after the storm. 
Robert Arnove, a Miami dive captain for 11 years, said 
the following about the Tarpon, a l65-foot sunken 
vessel: 
Everything that was alive on the reef was 
picked clean. It was alive with soft corals, 
sea fans, and sponges, and now nothing is 
there. It has been ripped right out of the 
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bottom. I swam way north and way south along 
the reef and it's all the same. It's just 
devastated. Looking to the future, you have 
to wonder if it will ever be a viable dive 
site again (Arnove 1992). 
Since Andrew, the destruction of natural coral 
reefs in south Florida has similarly hurt the local dive 
economy, both commercial and recreational. Again, this 
impact was not quickly appreciated by local governmental 
officials. So far, we have received no assessments of 
the impact on marine productivity which may have 
resulted from damages to artificial and natural reefs 
caused by Andrew, but we feel sure such impact will be 
seen as very significant once it is fully known. 
Impacts on fish processors, wholesalers and 
retailers. Fish processors and marketeers are an 
essential link between marine resources and the public, 
and are indispensable to commercial fishers who rely on 
them to process and market their catches. As mentioned 
above, south Florida's fish processors and marketeers 
were hard hit. 
We analyzed information provided to the Florida DNR 
by all fish processors and marketeers in south Florida 
who operate either in the directly impacted area, the 
area immediately surrounding it, or south of it in the 
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keys. Our data consisted of periodic reports which 
processors and dealers sent to the DNR after the 
hurricane. Altogether, 108 reports from fish processors 
and fishery-products dealers were examined, including 80 
from Miami, 3 from Miami Beach, 1 from Coconut Grove, 1 
from Coral Gables, 1 from Perrine, 9 from Homestead, 1 
from Florida City, 10 from Key Largo, 1 from Tavernier, 
and 1 from Big Pine Key. Among the 108 reports we 
examined, a total of 64, or 59%, reported adverse 
impacts on their businesses stemming from Andrew. 
These reported adverse impacts included losses 
stemming from structural damage, the total loss of 
facilities, and other losses, including losses of 
products, electricity, refrigeration capacity, product 
suppliers, capital (e.g., boats and traps), and income 
in downtime while repairing facilities. Phrases used to 
describe these negative impacts included "damaged, not 
yet open," "victims of Andrew," "destroyed by Andrew," 
"lost everything," "hit hard," "torn up," "wiped out," 
and "out of business due to Andrew." As mentioned 
above, most of the keys lost power for several weeks 
following the storm, and some dealers are still without 
electricity and refrigeration capacity even now. 
During our field study we interviewed a major fish 
processor/dealer in Key Largo concerning the impact of 
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Andrew. His processing facility had escaped major 
damage and had participated in the relief effort by 
supplying badly needed ice to the more severely impacted 
region immediately to the north. He employed about a 
dozen workers who processed and marketed the catches of 
some 50 boats working in the immediate vicinity. 
He stated that he was unaware of the extent of 
damages to the fishing industry south of Key Largo, and 
angrily stressed that no fisheries' agents had come to 
assess damages to his operation, nor to assess damages 
among the fishermen he served. He saw Andrew as a new 
and heavy burden on an already declining and 
over-burdened fishery. He blamed this decline on the 
various regulatory agencies having authority over 
Florida's fisheries, which, he said, had saddled the 
commercial fishing industry with a tangle of confusing, 
contradictory, and ever-changing regulations. The 
regulatory rules and policies, he said, were so 
confusing, and so often changed, that he and local 
fishers had no idea who had the "last word," and overall 
this had created a situation of such great uncertainty 
that it was hard for him and local fishers to remain 
viable commercially. He also complained that fishery 
officials continuously harassed him and other local 
fishers, saying they often behaved in a bullying and 
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retaliatory manner. 
Another major concern voiced by this operator was 
the possibility of severe marine pollution and loss of 
valuable marine species which may have resulted from the 
abrupt opening of a major canal (C-lll) after Andrew 
hit, in order to drain excess fresh water from the south 
end of the Florida peninsula. This canal empties into 
Barnes Sound, a major fishing area near Key Largo. The 
operator we talked with in Key Largo expressed concerns 
that fresh water from this canal had conveyed 
fertilizers, pesticides, and other chemicals used mainly 
in south Florida agriculture into Barnes Sound, with 
potentially disastrous consequences for nearby coral 
reefs and sea grasses. However, what upset him the 
most, he said, echoing the spiny-lobster fishers we had 
talked with along the Miami River, was that nobody from 
the state or federal agencies who were responsible for 
the region's fisheries had ever asked him or any other 
local fishers how they had been impacted by the 
disaster, nor what their particular needs and problems 
were in its aftermath. 
Impact on the marine-recreational sector. The 
recreational sector of south Florida's marine fisheries 
inordinately overshadows the commercial sector in terms 
of its economic significance and overall participation, 
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and was severely impacted by Hurricane Andrew. Indeed, 
one of the most indelible memories of our trip to 
Florida is the hundreds of crushed and utterly destroyed 
recreational boats we saw at the Black Point Marina. 
Certainly the hurricane caused substantial economic 
losses for recreational boat owners, especially those 
who were inadequately insured, as well as lost 
recreational opportunities. Moreover, it caused severe 
economic losses for the large number of individuals and 
business which supply and service the recreational boat 
sector. 
While not wishing to minimize the profound 
aesthetic, recreational, social, and economic losses 
suffered by south Florida's recreational fishing sector, 
we felt it necessary to limit our investigation to the 
region's commercial fishing peoples. That is where our 
expertise mainly lies, and we also feel that the needs 
of commercial fishers in the aftermath of an extreme 
event should take precedence over those of 
recreationists. This is because commercial fishers 
ultimately depend on fishing activity for their 
livelihood, whereas fishing for recreational fishers, 
however much it enriches their lives, is not as crucial 
to their overall well being. 
An important exception, of course, is charterboat 
-37-
operators who take clients out for fishing, diving, and 
other activities. We mention them in this section 
because they are often regarded by regulatory 
authorities as a part of the recreational-fishing 
sector. We regard them as "commercial fishers" because 
fishing is their means of livelihood. In south Florida, 
many charterboat operators suffered severe impacts from 
the hurricane, including lost or damaged vessels, gear, 
and shore facilities, downtime, and a diminished stream 
of clients. Many of these operators rely on the 
abundance of marine species found around southeast 
Florida's artificial reefs to support their businesses, 
and thus may not find the marine life as robust there in 
the near future as it was prior to the storm. 
Impacts on fishery habitat, including mangroves, 
seagrasses, coral reefs, and sea turtle nesting areas. 
Various government agencies and scientific institutions, 
including the Florida DNR, the NMFS, the RSMAS, and many 
others have by now launched investigations concerning 
Hurricane Andrew's overall impact on the marine 
environment and important marine resources found in the 
waters around south Florida. And, not surprisingly, 
their preliminary reports all suggest that the storm did 
indeed have a devastating and extensive impact on these 
environments and resources, which is opposite the 
earlier views about the storm's impact which were 
expressed by certain fisheries' officials in south 
Florida. 
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It is not our intention here to elaborate upon 
these marine-environmental impacts, since our 
investigation focused mainly on the impacts of the storm 
on people, and not on marine resources per se. An 
important point to remember, however, is that 
practically every report describing damages to south 
Florida's marine environments, and especially those 
describing impacts in any region which is designated as 
a "fishery," almost certainly implies unfavorable 
consequences for the people who depended on those 
fisheries for their livelihoods. 
Discussion 
Clearly, the impact of Hurricane Andrew on 
commercial fishers living in southeast Florida was more 
severe than what was suggested in the early reports 
about the storm. This damage must be appreciated from 
an holistic perspective of these fisheries, which 
emphasizes the human actors who are articulated with the 
various marine resources. 
Interesting parallels and contrasts regarding 
response to impacts on commercial fishers in south 
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Florida can be drawn from examining the responses to two 
other extreme events impacting commercial fishers: the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill (EVOS) in Alaska, and the impact 
of Hurricane Andrew on commercial fishers in Louisiana 
(regarding the EVOS, see Dyer 1993a; Dyer, Gill, and 
Picou 1992; and Picou, Gill, Dyer, and Curry 1992. 
Regarding Louisiana, see Dyer 1993b). 
The EVOS greatly threatened the sustainabilty of 
Alaskan communities which were highly dependent on 
renewable fishery resources in their immediate vicinity. 
However, unlike in Florida, commercial fishers in Alaska 
were given considerable attention in the aftermath of 
the EVOS, including extensive assessments of their 
damages and what their immediate needs were for 
recovery. Also unlike in Florida, the Alaska-coast 
natural-resource communities which were impacted by the 
EVOS, and which depended on fishery resources, differed 
considerably from the natural-resource communities of 
commercial fishers in south Florida. For one thing, a 
higher proportion of Alaska's coastal populace is 
dependent on local fisheries, and commercial fishers 
have high visibility along the Alaska coast. Moreover, 
Alaska's commercial fishers have less competition from 
recreational fishers. 
The situation in Louisiana was similar to that in 
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Alaska. As in Alaska, commercial fishing peoples in 
Louisiana who were impacted by Hurricane Andrew are a 
highly visible and economically important component of 
the coastal population. Indeed, commercial fishing in 
Louisiana is regarded as very important to the economic 
welfare of the state as a whole. Commercial fishing 
activity also overshadows recreational fishing in terms 
of its economic importance in Louisiana, with 
Louisiana's commercial fishers experiencing less 
competition with the recreational sector than do their 
counterparts in south Florida. 
Hurricane Andrew's impact on commercial fishing 
peoples in Louisiana was quickly assessed by state and 
federal agencies, and problems among fishers, 
processors, and their families were responded to in a 
comprehensive and effective manner. Knowing full well 
the importance of the commercial fisheries in the state, 
various agencies in Louisiana immediately launched 
projects to account for the enormous losses in the 
state's fishing industry brought about by the storm. 
Support for Louisiana's commercial fishers was also 
taken up by various state representatives, including 
Senator Tauzin, who sought exemptions from certain 
regulations which fishermen felt might hinder their 
abilities to recuperate from the hurricane's impacts. 
-41-
In sum, we feel the following factors explain the 
almost non-response to the damages and needs of south 
Florida's commercial fishers stemming from Hurricane 
Andrew: 
1. The low visibility of commercial fishers in 
south Florida, owing to their geographic dispersion, 
and integration with a far larger urban, suburban, and 
exurban populace scattered along the south Florida 
coast. 
2. The low numbers of commercial fishers in south 
Florida relative to the size of the total human populace 
in the region. Recall that one of the NMFS officials 
we interviewed in Miami had said that there were "almost 
no commercial fishermen" along Florida's southeast 
coast. Perhaps the reality of "almost no commercial 
fishermen" was conducive to producing a mindset among 
fisheries' authorities that there were not enough 
fishing people to worry about. 
Because our trip involved little more than a brief 
reconnaissance, we do not have exhaustive data 
concerning how many commercial fishing people there were 
in south Florida when the hurricane hit. Nevertheless, 
we feel certain that in the aggregate these constituted 
a significant population. By counting licensed fishers, 
processors, and marketeers for whom we do have reliable 
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data, and adding their estimated numbers of dependents, 
we feel there were more than a thousand people in the 
directly impacted region of south Florida who depended 
on commercial fishing before the hurricane hit. And, if 
we consider all fishers and their dependents in south 
Florida, including the keys, who were adversely impacted 
by Hurricane Andrew, then we feel these amounted to 
several thousand people. 
3. The large number of recreational fishers in 
south Florida as compared with commercial fishers, their 
greater visibility, and especially their greater ability 
to influence fisheries-management assessments, policies, 
and regulations. As Dr. William W. Fox, current 
director of the National Marine Fisheries Service and 
former head of the Florida Marine Fisheries Commission 
has said of Florida's fisheries, "I think you'll find 
that most of our regulations were oriented toward 
recreational fishing" (Fox 1990: 44). 
4. Longstanding antipathy and adversarial 
relationships between participants in the commercial 
fishing industry and various governmental agents who are 
responsible for managing the fisheries. Unfortunately, 
this has prompted feelings of apathy and futility among 
both groups concerning any benefits that might accrue 
from initiating communications with one another. 
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5. No municipal, city, county, regional, state, or 
federal agencies acknowledged responsibility for 
assessing the impacts of the storm on the commercial 
fishing industry, nor for determining what was needed in 
the way of relief and recovery assistance following the 
event. A FEMA representative we spoke with in south 
Florida, when we asked him if he felt there was a need 
for someone to address the impacts of Hurricane Andrew 
on natural resource users--including specific 
occupational groups such as commercial fishers--agreed 
that there was definitely such a need, and that this 
represented a deficiency in the response capabilities of 
the FEMA. 
6. Unconcern, and perhaps antipathy, for 
commercial fishing peoples in the local marine-science 
community. When we visited the main offices of the 
RSMAS, the only concern regarding commercial fishers we 
saw was negative, consisting of leaflets posted on 
entrance doors and interior bulletin boards which urged 
a ban on commercial fisher's use of certain types of 
nets. Moreover, although we have corresponded with the 
RSMAS since our visit, urging that it include a study of 
commercial fishers in its proposed interdisciplinary 
project to study the impacts of Andrew in south Florida, 
we are unaware it has any plans to do so. 
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We also visited the University of Miami main campus 
while we were in Florida, but were unable to learn of 
any faculty members there who were conducting studies of 
the hurricane's impact on south Florida's commercial 
fishers. 
7. An erroneous view which appeared in the print 
and other media in the early aftermath of the event, 
which greatly underestimated the storm's impacts on the 
fisheries, and which, perhaps, was subsequently reified 
by some authorities as justification for not concerning 
themselves any further. 
Recommendations 
Among the various agencies of the u.s. federal 
government, the NMFS is the one which should take 
responsibility for assessing impacts and needs of 
commercial fishing peoples stemming from extreme natural 
and technological events. This agency already has an 
organizational structure with established networks of 
communications between the fisheries in coastal regions 
and its central headquarters. Moreover, it has more 
information, and more experience working with commercial 
fishing peoples, than any other agency in the federal 
government. Thus, a component should be developed 
within this agency which will concern itself with 
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extreme events in coastal areas, and especially with the 
impacts of such events on commercial fishing peoples. 
This component should also work closely with other 
federal agencies including the FEMA and the SBA, as well 
as with state and local agencies having interests in 
local fisheries. 
The Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 
1976 (now simply know as the "Magnuson Act," after the 
name of its original sponsor) mandates that the NMFS 
concern itself not only with the welfare of fishery 
resources, but also with the welfare of fishing peoples. 
Thus, the act requires that the NMFS consider social 
impacts in the formulation of fishery-management 
policies. Unfortunately, however, there is no 
legislation (or, at least, none that we are aware of) 
which specifically requires the NMFS to assess impacts 
and to assist commercial fishing peoples in the 
aftermath of extreme events which impact the fisheries. 
We feel the NMFS has remained unduly focused on 
fishery resources, rather than on what should be their 
first concern--fishing peoples--and continues to define 
its role and principal responsibilities as lying mainly 
in the realm of marine conservation, rather than in 
promoting the well being of maritime people (see Fox 
1990: 44-45). 
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Our conclusions are drawn from little more than a 
brief field trip by two investigators to this region, as 
well as extensive queries through correspondence both 
before our trip and continuing ever since. And, while 
we do not have quantitatively comprehensive data which 
measures and assesses the overall impact of Hurricane 
Andrew on south Florida's commercial fishing peoples, we 
feel we have conclusive proof that this impact was very 
serious indeed. 
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